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Self-enforcement, heterogeneous agents, and long-run survival
- Author(s)
- Han, Kookyoung
- Issued Date
- 2021-07
- Citation
- ECONOMICS LETTERS, v.204, pp.109906
- Abstract
- We consider an infinite horizon game in which players have heterogeneous beliefs about future endowments process and trade with each other. Focusing on Pareto-efficient subgame-perfect equilibria, we find that unlike dynamic general equilibrium models, every player's consumption is bounded away from zero. That is, every player survives in a Pareto-efficient subgame-perfect equilibrium. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
- Publisher
- ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
- ISSN
- 0165-1765
- Keyword (Author)
- Market selection, Pareto efficiency, Subgame-perfect equilibrium, Heterogeneous players
- Keyword
- MARKET SELECTION
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