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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.citation.startPage | 109906 | - |
dc.citation.title | ECONOMICS LETTERS | - |
dc.citation.volume | 204 | - |
dc.contributor.author | Han, Kookyoung | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-12-21T15:38:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-12-21T15:38:02Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-09-07 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021-07 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider an infinite horizon game in which players have heterogeneous beliefs about future endowments process and trade with each other. Focusing on Pareto-efficient subgame-perfect equilibria, we find that unlike dynamic general equilibrium models, every player's consumption is bounded away from zero. That is, every player survives in a Pareto-efficient subgame-perfect equilibrium. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | ECONOMICS LETTERS, v.204, pp.109906 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109906 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-1765 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85106372162 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholarworks.unist.ac.kr/handle/201301/55374 | - |
dc.identifier.url | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517652100183X | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000661252000018 | - |
dc.language | 영어 | - |
dc.publisher | ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA | - |
dc.title | Self-enforcement, heterogeneous agents, and long-run survival | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | FALSE | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | ssci | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Market selection | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Pareto efficiency | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Subgame-perfect equilibrium | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Heterogeneous players | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MARKET SELECTION | - |
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