CEO Duality and Firm Performance: Does Economic Policy Uncertainty Mediate the Relation?
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- CEO Duality and Firm Performance: Does Economic Policy Uncertainty Mediate the Relation?
- Chang, Kiyoung; Lee, Jun-Youp; Shim, Hyeongsop
- Issue Date
- John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
- INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, v.19, no.4, pp.877 - 891
- Exploiting two exogenous shocks, we examine the relation between CEO-Chairman duality and firm performance. We report evidence that CEO duality benefits a firm when economic policy uncertainty is high. This implies that CEO-‐Chairman duality is an advantageous governance mechanism for coping with economic policy uncertainty. We show that the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act reduced firm performance if a firm had separate leadership in 2001. However, this negative effect was mitigated if a firm had combined leadership in 2001. The results suggest that CEO duality is complementary to board independence and that the value of CEO duality is contingent on a firm’s environment.
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