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Lee, Jun-Youp
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CEO Duality and Firm Performance: Does Economic Policy Uncertainty Mediate the Relation?

Author(s)
Chang, KiyoungLee, Jun-YoupShim, Hyeongsop
Issued Date
2019-12
DOI
10.1111/irfi.12193
URI
https://scholarworks.unist.ac.kr/handle/201301/24007
Fulltext
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/irfi.12193
Citation
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, v.19, no.4, pp.877 - 891
Abstract
Exploiting two exogenous shocks, we examine the relation between CEO-Chairman duality and firm performance. We report evidence that CEO duality benefits a firm when economic policy uncertainty is high. This implies that CEO-‐Chairman duality is an advantageous governance mechanism for coping with economic policy uncertainty. We show that the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act reduced firm performance if a firm had separate leadership in 2001. However, this negative effect was mitigated if a firm had combined leadership in 2001. The results suggest that CEO duality is complementary to board independence and that the value of CEO duality is contingent on a firm’s environment.
Publisher
John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
ISSN
1369-412X
Keyword
BOARDSSIZE

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