Six New Arguments for Scientific Realism

Abstract

I introduce the following six new arguments for realism, all of which radically differ from the no-miracles argument. The optimistic induction over realists holds that since the realists of the early 20th century were right to believe the theories of their time, their present and future philosophical offspring are also right to believe the theories of their times. The argument from undiscovered evidence holds that because T has been supported by previously undiscovered evidence, it will continue to be supported by hitherto undiscovered evidence. The argument from neighboring theories holds that since T has been reinforced by previously unconceived neighboring theories, it will continue to be reinforced by hitherto unconceived neighboring theories. The counter-induction for realism asserts that since earlier theories were ousted, their present successors will not be ousted. The English argument for realism holds that under the English notion of rationality, it is rational to believe T, although it is also rational not to believe T. These five new arguments for realism entitle us to construct a second-order argument for scientific realism that I call “the grand optimistic induction.” It holds that since realism has been supported by the five previously unconceived arguments, it will continue to be supported by hitherto unconceived arguments.