Anthropomorphism as Social Action: The Politics of Animals on Display

Abstract

The article presents a case study from the city of Ulsan, where dolphins have been displayed in an aquarium as “immigrants” who became naturalized as Koreans. This use of anthropomorphism seems to have no useful function when analyzed as a representation, because it does not compel belief, nor does it endow actors with the capacity for meaningful action. To explain the existence of the “dolphin-as-immigrant” discourse, two different theoretical perspectives are compared, one which derives from mainstream anthropology and another from ontological anthropology. The two perspectives provide contrasting strategies for describing capacities for agency and social action, by problematizing the relationship between knowledge and action with differing sets of assumptions. In mainstream anthropology, the “dolphin-as-immigrant” is merely a representation, but ontological anthropology opposes the portrayal of culture as representation. Ontological anthropology provides an alternative account of agency, by moving beyond human knowledge and cultural representation, focusing instead on the ways that nonhumans and humans are related in political configurations. The goal of the comparison of mainstream anthropology and ontological anthropology is not to show which perspective is more useful, but to highlight the ways in which anthropomorphism can create meaningful political relationships between humans and nonhuman animals. In conclusion, it is argued that ontological anthropology is compatible with the goals and aims of anthropology, in that both specify the relationships between the knowledge of human actors and the possibilities of social action.