Various Pessimistic Inductions and Their Imports

Abstract

There are various pessimistic inductions in the philosophy of science literature. Poincaré’s pessimistic induction over scientific theories (1905/1952) holds that present theories will be overthrown as were past theories. Stanford’s pessimistic induction over scientists (2006) holds that present scientists cannot conceive of future theories just as past scientists could not conceive of present theories. Wray’s pessimistic induction over realists (2013) holds that present realists are wrong about present theories just as past realists were wrong about past theories. Park’s pessimistic induction over antirealist explanations of the success of science (2014) holds that the present antirealist’s proposal has hidden problems just as its several predecessors did. After criticizing the pessimistic inductions over scientific theories, scientists, and realists, I construct the pessimistic induction over antirealists, according to which the present antirealist cannot see hidden problems with his proposal just as past antirealists could not see hidden problems with theirs.