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- Park, Seungbae
- Philosophy of Science Lab.
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How to Overcome Antirealists’ Objections to Scientific Realism
- Author(s)
- Park, Seungbae
- Issued Date
- 2020-02
- Citation
- AXIOMATHES, v.30, no.1, pp.1 - 12
- Abstract
- Van Fraassen contends that there is no argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve a successful theory, T. I object that this contention places upon him the burden of showing that scientific antirealists’ favorite arguments, such as the pessimistic induction, do not rationally compel us to disbelieve T. Van Fraassen uses the English view of rationality to rationally disbelieve T. I argue that realists can use it to rationally believe T, despite scientific antirealists’ favorite arguments against T.
- Publisher
- Springer
- ISSN
- 1122-1151
- Keyword (Author)
- English view of rationality, Pessimistic induction, Scientific realism, van Fraassen
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