Normal Accidents From Status and Structural Holes: Relational Sources of Accidents in the U.S. Airline Industry, 1978 to 2011

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the normal accident-inducing effect of two network positions: status and structural holes, which are often regarded as critical sources of relational advantages. Contrary to the existing theoretical and practical view that accidents occur due to operational or engineering problems, we suggest that an organization's status and structural holes in the interorganizational alliance network can also cause accidents. Drawing upon insights from normal accident theory, which highlights the accident-inducing effects of complexity, tight coupling, and slack shortage, we argue that differentiation costs stemming from status and complexity costs from structural holes increase the likelihood of accidents occurring. Moreover, slack shortage increases the accident-inducing effect of status by augmenting differentiation costs, whereas they reduce the accident-inducing effect of structural holes by diminishing complexity costs. The generalized estimating equations results of our empirical study of the U.S. airline industry from 1978 to 2011 strongly support our theoretical arguments. Accidents are more likely to occur when a focal airline holds a higher status in interfirm alliance networks and occupies a structural-hole rich position. Additionally, our results suggest that a shortage of human resource slack amplifies the accident-inducing effect of status while mitigating the effect of structural holes. The implications of the unintended negative outcomes of presumably advantageous network positions and the relational sources of accidents are discussed.