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Park, Seungbae
School of Liberal Arts
Research Interests
  • Philosophy of Science


Ontological Order in Scientific Explanation

DC Field Value Language Park, Seungbae ko 2014-11-17T08:08:55Z - 2014-11-17 ko 2003 ko
dc.identifier.citation PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, v.32, no.2, pp.157 - 170 ko
dc.identifier.issn 0556-8641 ko
dc.identifier.uri -
dc.description.abstract A scientific theory is successful, according to Stanford (2000), because it is suficiently observationally similar to its corresponding true theory. The Ptolemaic theory, for example, is successful because it is sufficiently similar to the Copernican theory at the observational level. The suggestion meets the scientific realists' request to explain the success of science without committing to the (approximate) truth of successful scientific theories. I argue that Stanford's proposal has a conceptual flaw. A conceptually sound explanation, I claim, respects the ontological order between properties. A dependent property is to be explained in terms of its underlying property, not the other way around. The applicability of this point goes well beyond the realm of the debate between scientific realists and antirealists. Any philosophers should keep the point in mind when they attempt to give an explanation of a property in their field whatever it may be. ko
dc.description.statementofresponsibility open -
dc.language 영어 ko
dc.publisher ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS ko
dc.title Ontological Order in Scientific Explanation ko
dc.type ARTICLE ko
dc.type.rims ART ko
dc.identifier.doi 10.1080/05568640309485120 ko
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