OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM CASH HOLDINGS: EVIDENCE FROM THE PUBLIC FLOAT IN IPOS

Abstract

I examine the effect of insider ownership on the level of cash holding by measuring the percentage of shares issued to the public, namely public float. Using a sample of 4,402 IPOs between 1990 and 2013, I find that public float has significantly negative relation with the level of firm’s cash holdings. Specifically, the reduced insider ownership by large percentage of shares issued to the public seems to motivate insiders to waste more cash, resulting in decrease in the level of cash holding. This relation persists even after controlling for various firm characteristics. High public float (or small insider ownership) also exacerbate agency problem evidenced by public float being positively associated with discretionary accrual proxy for agency problem. The level of cash holding reduced further when we interact public float with discretionary accrual term. Collectively, this finding suggests that large sales in insider ownership in IPO market worsen the agency problem and consequently motivate insider to squander firm’s cash holding.