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최진혁

Choi, Jin Hyuk
Mathematical Finance Lab.
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dc.citation.startPage 109443 -
dc.citation.title ECONOMICS LETTERS -
dc.citation.volume 195 -
dc.contributor.author Choi, Jin Hyuk -
dc.contributor.author Han, Kookyoung -
dc.date.accessioned 2023-12-21T17:06:27Z -
dc.date.available 2023-12-21T17:06:27Z -
dc.date.created 2020-08-02 -
dc.date.issued 2020-10 -
dc.description.abstract We consider how a principal can optimally outsource information acquisition to an agent in a dynamic environment when the principal can observe neither the agent’s effort of collecting information nor signal realizations. Neither initial transaction nor interim payments are allowed to prevent the principal from effectively delegating her decision to the agent. Focusing on scoring rules, we find a contract that allows the principal to achieve the first best: the principal can induce the agent not only to exert effort but also to report a right belief at the right time. -
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation ECONOMICS LETTERS, v.195, pp.109443 -
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109443 -
dc.identifier.issn 0165-1765 -
dc.identifier.scopusid 2-s2.0-85088870030 -
dc.identifier.uri https://scholarworks.unist.ac.kr/handle/201301/47391 -
dc.identifier.url https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176520302755 -
dc.identifier.wosid 000572330200020 -
dc.language 영어 -
dc.publisher Elsevier BV -
dc.title Optimal contract for outsourcing information acquisition -
dc.type Article -
dc.description.isOpenAccess FALSE -
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory Economics -
dc.relation.journalResearchArea Business & Economics -
dc.type.docType Article -
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass ssci -
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass scopus -
dc.subject.keywordAuthor Information acquisition -
dc.subject.keywordAuthor Optimal contract -
dc.subject.keywordAuthor Optimal stopping -
dc.subject.keywordAuthor Private observation -

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