dc.citation.endPage |
262 |
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dc.citation.number |
2 |
- |
dc.citation.startPage |
247 |
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dc.citation.title |
AXIOMATHES |
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dc.citation.volume |
24 |
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dc.contributor.author |
Yi, Huiyuhl |
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dc.date.accessioned |
2023-12-22T02:39:36Z |
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dc.date.available |
2023-12-22T02:39:36Z |
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dc.date.created |
2013-10-10 |
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dc.date.issued |
2014-06 |
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dc.description.abstract |
Psychological Sequentialism holds that no causal constraint is necessary for the preservation of what matters in survival; rather, it is sufficient for preservation if two groups of mental states are similar enough and temporally close enough. Suppose that one’s body is instantaneously dematerialized and subsequently, by an amazing coincidence, a collection of molecules is configured to form a qualitatively identical human body. According to Psychological Sequentialism, these events preserve what matters in survival. In this article, I examine some of the main arguments for the view and argue that they fail to establish that no causal constraint is necessary. I also argue that Psychological Sequentialism yields implausible consequences that render it hard to accept the view. |
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dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation |
AXIOMATHES, v.24, no.2, pp.247 - 262 |
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dc.identifier.doi |
10.1007/s10516-013-9221-8 |
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dc.identifier.issn |
1122-1151 |
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dc.identifier.scopusid |
2-s2.0-84901287820 |
- |
dc.identifier.uri |
https://scholarworks.unist.ac.kr/handle/201301/4150 |
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dc.identifier.url |
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84901287820 |
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dc.identifier.wosid |
000336395800005 |
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dc.language |
영어 |
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dc.publisher |
SPRINGER |
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dc.title |
Against Psychological Sequentialism |
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dc.type |
Article |
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dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory |
Philosophy |
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dc.relation.journalResearchArea |
Philosophy |
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dc.description.journalRegisteredClass |
ahci |
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dc.description.journalRegisteredClass |
scopus |
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