dc.citation.endPage |
342 |
- |
dc.citation.number |
3 |
- |
dc.citation.startPage |
329 |
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dc.citation.title |
GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN |
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dc.citation.volume |
95 |
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dc.contributor.author |
Park, Seungbae |
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dc.date.accessioned |
2023-12-21T20:36:43Z |
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dc.date.available |
2023-12-21T20:36:43Z |
- |
dc.date.created |
2017-10-31 |
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dc.date.issued |
2018-08 |
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dc.description.abstract |
In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, the author constructs a new argument for scientific realism, which he calls the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. The author provides an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over the no-miracles argument as a positive argument for scientific realism. |
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dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation |
GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN, v.95, no.3, pp.329 - 342 |
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dc.identifier.doi |
10.1163/18756735-000044 |
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dc.identifier.issn |
0165-9227 |
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dc.identifier.scopusid |
2-s2.0-85053216138 |
- |
dc.identifier.uri |
https://scholarworks.unist.ac.kr/handle/201301/22888 |
- |
dc.identifier.url |
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/18756735-000044 |
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dc.language |
영어 |
- |
dc.publisher |
Editions Rodopi b.v. |
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dc.title |
The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism |
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dc.type |
Article |
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dc.description.isOpenAccess |
FALSE |
- |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass |
scopus |
- |