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박승배

Park, Seungbae
Philosophy of Science Lab.
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The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism

Author(s)
Park, Seungbae
Issued Date
2018-08
DOI
10.1163/18756735-000044
URI
https://scholarworks.unist.ac.kr/handle/201301/22888
Fulltext
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/18756735-000044
Citation
GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN, v.95, no.3, pp.329 - 342
Abstract
In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, the author constructs a new argument for scientific realism, which he calls the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. The author provides an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over the no-miracles argument as a positive argument for scientific realism.
Publisher
Editions Rodopi b.v.
ISSN
0165-9227

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