File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  • Find it @ UNIST can give you direct access to the published full text of this article. (UNISTARs only)
Related Researcher

박승배

Park, Seungbae
Philosophy of Science Lab.
Read More

Views & Downloads

Detailed Information

Cited time in webofscience Cited time in scopus
Metadata Downloads

Defense of Epistemic Reciprocalism

Author(s)
Park, Seungbae
Issued Date
2017-03
DOI
10.11149/jkaoh.2017.41.1.56
URI
https://scholarworks.unist.ac.kr/handle/201301/21158
Fulltext
http://www.lmaleidykla.lt/filosofijasociologija/2017/1/7370
Citation
FILOSOFIJA-SOCIOLOGIJA, v.28, no.1, pp.56 - 64
Abstract
Scientific realists and antirealists believe that a successful scientific theory is true and merely empirically adequate, respectively. In contrast, epistemic reciprocalists believe that realists’ positive theories are true, and that antirealists’ positive theories are merely empirically adequate, treating their target agents as their target agents treat other epistemic agents. Antirealists cannot convince reciprocalists that their positive theories are true, no matter how confident they might be that they are true. In addition, reciprocalists criticize antirealists’ positive theories exactly in the way that antirealists criticize their epistemic colleagues’ theories. Reciprocalism is a better epistemic policy than realism and antirealism in the epistemic battleground in which we strive to be epistemically safe vis-à-vis our epistemic colleagues’ theories and strive to convince our epistemic colleagues that our theories are true.
Publisher
LITHUANIAN ACAD SCIENCES
ISSN
0235-7186

qrcode

Items in Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.