

The Problem of Divine Evaluation

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Abstract: I raise the following six moral objections to the way God evaluates us. (i) He violates the human right to free thought. (ii) He makes the dubious assumption that it is praiseworthy and blameworthy, respectively, to believe and disbelieve that he exists. (iii) He excessively rewards believers and excessively punishes disbelievers. (iv) He only assigns to his evaluates the two extreme grades: eternal bliss and eternal damnation. (v) He overlooks diverse factors related to the belief of God. (vi) He is silent on the issue of whether to evaluate animals. Therefore, God, who is allegedly omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, does not exist.

Keywords: belief, disbelief, God, heaven, hell, human right, justice.

1. Introduction

This paper presents a new argument against the existence of God. According to Pascal's Wager, if we believe that God exists, we will enjoy eternal bliss in heaven, and if we disbelieve that he exists, we will suffer eternal damnation in hell.¹ Is it morally justifiable for him to send believers to heaven and reward them with eternal bliss? Is it morally justifiable for him to send disbelievers to hell and punish them with eternal damnation? This paper defends negative answers to these questions, and concludes that God, who is purported to be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, does not exist.

I raise the following six objections to God's evaluation system one by one in each section below. (i) God violates the human right to free thought. (ii) He makes the dubious assumption that it is praiseworthy and blameworthy, respectively, to believe and to disbelieve that he exists. (iii) He excessively rewards believers and excessively punishes disbelievers. (iv) He only assigns to his evaluatees² the two extreme grades: eternal bliss and eternal damnation. (v) He overlooks diverse factors related to the belief of God (the belief that God exists). (vi) He is silent on the issue of whether to evaluate animals. These flaws with God's evaluation system suggest either that he is less intelligent, moral, just, and benevolent than humans, or that he does not exist.

¹ In Subsection 8.1, I reply to the possible objection that Pascal's Wager does not assume that disbelievers are sent to hell.

² I prefer the term 'evaluatees' to the term 'people' because it is controversial whether our souls are people.

2. No Freedom of Thought

Many countries today ensure freedom of thought to their citizens. Thanks to freedom of thought, citizens can hold and express any political or religious views without being punished by their governments. The international community condemns as uncivilized any country which represses freedom of thought.

According to God's evaluation system, however, he *punishes* disbelievers with eternal unhappiness, which implies that he violates the fundamental human right. His punishment, eternal damnation in hell, is more severe than any human punishment. Therefore, we can infer that he suppresses freedom of thought more severely than any tyrant in human history.

It is not clear why God violates this fundamental human right. An unconfident ruler of a country tends to fear rebellion, and as a result, tends to restrict freedom of thought. In contrast, a confident ruler tends not to fear rebellion, and as a result, tends to permit or encourage freedom of thought. Since God is omnipotent, he can easily quell any rebellion by humans. Consequently, it is mysterious why he violates the fundamental human right.

In addition, the idea that God sends disbelievers to hell clashes with the idea that God gave us the inalienable right to free thought, and that governments, thus, cannot justly deprive us of it. To say that God bestowed this right on us means that he would *not punish* us for exercising it. Giving us merely the mental and physical abilities to hold and express the disbelief of God does not count as giving us the right to free thought.

3. Praiseworthy and Blameworthy

Is it praiseworthy and blameworthy, respectively, to believe and disbelieve that God exists? Answering this question requires that we compare believing and disbelieving that God exists with actions that we usually regard as praiseworthy and blameworthy.

Altruistic people perform praiseworthy acts. For example, they donate their organs to patients and provide volunteer services for underprivileged children. Such acts involve sacrifice for the needy. Given that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, however, he does not need humans' belief of him in the way patients need organs, or in the way underprivileged children need volunteer services. Thus, it is not clear what the justification is for thinking that it is praiseworthy to believe that God exists.

Selfish people perform blameworthy acts, such as theft, rape, and murder. These acts involve damage on others. Given that God has the three properties, however, to disbelieve that he exists does not involve damage on him in the way theft involves damage on a theft victim, in the way rape involves damage on a rape victim, or in the way murder involves damage a murder victim. Thus, it is not clear what the justification is for thinking that it is blameworthy to disbelieve that he exists.

Theists might reply that it is praiseworthy to believe that God exists because the belief of him allows them to have a relationship with him and thus to attain union with him. However, this reply is not convincing to me. I can grant that the belief of him allows believers to have eternal happiness. However, I do not see any relevant similarity between enjoying eternal happiness as a result of holding the belief of God and donating organs to patients any more than I can see a relevant similarity between enjoying extreme happiness as a result of winning a lottery of a million dollars and donating organs to patients. Just as there is nothing morally praiseworthy about enjoying extreme happiness as a result of winning the lottery, so there is nothing morally praiseworthy about enjoying eternal happiness as a result of holding the belief of God.

Theists might meet this challenge by appealing to the divine command theory, according to which “what makes an action right is that God commands it to be done.” (Schick and Vaughn 2010, 358) On this account, it is moral to help your neighbors because God likes it, and immoral to hurt them because he hates it. In this vein, theists might propose that it is praiseworthy to believe that he exists because he likes the belief of him.

This appeal to the divine command theory, however, has two problems. First, it indicates that it is blameworthy to disbelieve that God exists because he hates the disbelief of him. As we have seen in the previous section, however, it is not blameworthy to disbelieve that he exists, and hence he should not hate humans’ holding the disbelief of him. Second, it is not clear why it is praiseworthy for him to like humans who hold the belief of him. Of course, he likes those who hold the belief of him, but there is nothing praiseworthy about his liking them.

Theists, again appealing to the divine command theory, would suggest that it is praiseworthy for God to like humans’ holding the belief of him because he likes his own liking of humans’ holding the belief of him. On this account, his second-order mental state makes his first-order mental state praiseworthy. Specifically, his liking of his own liking of humans’ holding the belief of him makes his liking of humans’ holding the belief of him praiseworthy.

This account, however, requires that God has an infinite number of narcissistic high-order mental states in order to make his own liking of humans’ holding the belief of him praiseworthy. Such an account cannot relieve critics of the original puzzle over why his liking of humans’ holding the belief of him is praiseworthy.

4. Excessive Reward and Punishment

Set aside the discussion in Section 3 and grant that it is praiseworthy and blameworthy, respectively, to believe and disbelieve that God exists. Even if this is so, there is the further issue as to how praiseworthy and blameworthy it is to believe and disbelieve that God exists.

According to God’s evaluation system, believers are so praiseworthy that they deserve eternal bliss, while disbelievers so blameworthy that they deserve

eternal damnation. But do they merit such excessive desserts? Suppose a law provides that yielding a seat to a pregnant woman in a subway will be rewarded with one million dollars, and that coughing in an elevator will be punished with a fine of one million dollars. This law and God's evaluation system are similar in that their degrees of rewards and punishments are exorbitantly high.

The degree of a reward or punishment should be proportional to the degree of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness of the act being evaluated. Let me call this idea *the proportionality principle*. We can determine how just an evaluation system is by using the proportionality principle. The more an evaluation system observes the proportionality principle, the more just it is, and the more it violates the proportionality principle, the more unjust it is. The aforementioned law and God's evaluation system receive low scores under the proportionality principle.

5. Two Extreme Grades

Let me expose another problematic aspect of God's evaluation system, viz., it issues only two extreme grades, viz., eternal bliss and eternal damnation.³ There are reasons for thinking that there should be numerous intermediate grades.

In general, beliefs last for periods of time. So one might believe that God exists for 80 years, 50 years, and so forth. Strictly speaking, Pascal's Wager does not simply say that if we believe that God exists, we will go to heaven, but rather that if we believe that God exists for a *long* time, we will go to heaven. Hájek says that "Pascal does not think that you would be infinitely rewarded for wagering for God momentarily, then wagering against God thereafter; nor that you would be infinitely rewarded for wagering for God sporadically." (2018) But exactly how long should we believe that God exists to go to heaven? Where does God draw the line? Should he draw a line at all?

Suppose that God draws the line at 50 years, that you and I believed that God exists for 80 years and 50 years, respectively, and that both you and I died at the age of 100. God, however, treats us both equally, i.e., God sends us both to heaven. This treatment violates the proportionality principle, given that your belief of him is more praiseworthy than mine. A better way to treat us would be to have you spend 80% of your afterlife in heaven and 20% of your afterlife in hell, and to have me spend 50% of my afterlife in heaven, and the other 50% in hell, other things being equal.

There is another better way to treat you and me. Suppose God created many realms between heaven and hell. They are all worse than heaven and better than hell in differing degrees. The more similar a realm is to heaven, the more pleasant it is. The more similar it is to hell, the more unpleasant it is. If you and I believed that God exists for 80 years and for 50 years, respectively, he would send you to a

³ I set aside the issue of purgatory for the sake of simplicity. I only point out that my objections to God's evaluation system can be recast to incorporate the idea of purgatory.

realm which is 80% similar to heaven, and me to a realm which is 50% similar to heaven, *ceteris paribus*.

Let me turn to a more unjust case. Suppose that you believed that God exists for 49 years, and that I believed that God exists for 50 years exactly. In this case, God treats you and I differently, i.e., he sends you to hell and me to heaven. This disparate treatment violates the proportionality principle more severely than the foregoing treatment of you and me. A much better way to treat us would be to have you spend 49% of your afterlife in heaven and 51% in hell, and to have me spend 50% of my afterlife in heaven and the other 50% in hell, other things being equal. Another much better way to treat us would be to send you to a world which is 49% similar to heaven, and me to a world which is 50% similar to heaven, *ceteris paribus*.

Theists might object that God's offer of salvation is best compared to a marriage proposal. At some point, one either answers 'Yes' or 'No.' The answer that one gives at any given time depends on the state of one's will at that time. It is not a matter of summing up the years of one's belief of God.

In my view, however, if this analogy were correct, we would not need to believe that God exists until our death is imminent. We would only need to say 'Yes,' right before we die, or right after we die, to God's offer of salvation. Moreover, those who suffer in hell would feel that it is unfair for God to send some to heaven for merely saying 'Yes' on his proposal. Again, it is mysterious why God created such an evaluation system. Why didn't he create the evaluation system in which we enjoy eternal happiness even if we say 'No' to his proposal?

Moreover, the analogy distorts Pascal's Wager. According to Hájek, "What Pascal intends by 'wagering for God' is an ongoing action – indeed, one that continues until your death – that involves your adopting a certain set of practices and living the kind of life that fosters belief in God." (2018) Note that according to Pascal's Wager, we should maintain the belief of God for a long time to go to heaven.

6. No Diverse Factors

God needs to consider not only the length of time one believes that he exists, but also the degree of that belief. In general, "beliefs come in degrees." (Goldman and Beddor 2016) For example, a doctor may believe that her cancer patient will live for the next three months, and the degree of her belief might be 90%, 80%, and so on. Analogously, a person might believe that God exists to the 90% degree, to the 80% degree, and so forth.

The fact that the belief of God comes in degrees raises an issue against God's evaluation system similar to the one unpacked in Section 5. To what degree should we believe that God exists to go to heaven? Where does God draw the line? Should he draw a line at all? Theists would have to answer these questions. I do not spell out their possible answers, nor my objections to them, because all of them can be extrapolated from the discussion in Section 5.

God needs to take into account another factor, viz., the length of life. Suppose you and I both believed that God exists to the 100% degree for 50 years, but that you lived to be 60, while I lived to be 100. Other things being equal, you are more qualified than I am to go to heaven. Now, what percentage of our lives should we believe that God exists to go to heaven? Where does God draw a line? Should we draw a line at all? Again, I do not spell out possible answers to these questions and objections to them because all of them can be extrapolated from the discussion in Section 5.

God needs to take into account another factor, viz., a person's conditions of life with respect to maintaining the belief of God. Suppose you and I believed that God exists to the equal degree for the same amount of time, that we died at the same age, but that you maintained your belief of God under adverse conditions whereas I was never under adverse conditions in my life. For example, you maintained your belief of God in a country where believers are persecuted, whereas I maintained my belief of God in a country where believers are respected. Again, you are more qualified to go to heaven. Adversity comes in degrees. How do the degrees of adversity relate to the chances of going to heaven? Suppose, for example, that the government tortured you for two hours and me for an hour, for believing that God exists. How much more likely is it that you will go to heaven than I? Whatever answers you might give, they can be disputed.

There is another factor that God needs to take into account. Suppose that you and I were both tortured for 10 hours for believing that God exists, but that you lived in the 11th century while I live in the 21st century. Other things being equal, I am more qualified than you to go to heaven, given that torture was a more prevalent part of our daily life in the 11th century than in the 21st century. On this account, withstanding torture to stick to the belief of God in the 11st century is less praiseworthy than in the 21st century. Thus, God should update his evaluation system as our value system changes over time, and it would be inappropriate for God to use the same evaluation system for a long time.

So far, I have introduced four factors that God needs to consider when he evaluates his evaluatees. They are the degree of the belief of God, the length of the belief of God, the percentage of life of believing that God exists, and the degree of the adversity of maintaining the belief of God.⁴ The existence of these multiple factors raises a new issue against God's evaluation system. How should the multiple factors be weighed? Does each factor take up 25%? Suppose you believed that God exists to the 60% degree for 20 years, that you died at the age of 90, and that you were tortured for believing that God exists for two hours. Suppose I believed that God exists to the 90% degree for 10 years, that I died at the age of 95, and that I was tortured for believing that God exists for three hours. Who is

⁴ I set aside other factors, such as the absence of knowledge of God. It sounds unreasonable to damn for eternity an aborigine and a stillborn infant who have never had any exposure to any teachings about God.

more likely to go to heaven? What exactly is the difference between your probability and my probability of going to heaven or hell? Answering this question requires that God have a sophisticated evaluation system. Such an evaluation system is currently unknown to us.

The more sophisticated an evaluation system is, the more intelligent its author is. Only an intelligent being can create a sophisticated evaluation system that issues diverse rewards and punishments to diverse evaluatees, based on the consideration of diverse factors. God's evaluation system depicted in Pascal's Wager is crude, in that it only doles out the extreme reward and the extreme punishment, and in that it does not consider the aforementioned diverse factors. It is mysterious why the infinitely intelligent being would execute such a crude evaluation system on us.

Theists might reply that God considers the diverse factors related to the belief of God, that he has a sophisticated evaluation system to sort his evaluatees into heaven-deservers and hell-deservers accurately and fairly. We cannot, however, know about it because we are finitely intelligent. How can a finite being know what an infinite being has in mind? Or theists might contend that we can know about it, but that knowing takes a lot of effort. The effort includes going to church, praying to God, tithing, and loving our neighbors.

An immediate objection to this move is that theists are also finitely intelligent. How do they know that God has the sophisticated evaluation system, or that we will find it, if we make a lot of effort? In addition, theists should *precisely* define 'a lot of effort.' Otherwise, it is merely an unfalsifiable assertion that a lot of effort will throw light on the sophisticated evaluation system. Theists should also provide a criterion for distinguishing between what we can and cannot (readily) know about God, and then explain why we cannot (readily) know about the sophisticated evaluation system. Otherwise, they have merely presented an *ad hoc* assumption that God has the sophisticated evaluation system, but that we cannot know about it.

Moreover, justice requires that people should be informed of a rule before it goes into effect. Suppose you drive a car at 110 km/h on a highway, and that the police stop you for speeding. You think that the speed limit has been 120 km/h, but police tell you that it is now 100 km/h. The government secretly enacted the new traffic law, and hid the traffic law book at the bottom of the Philippine Trench, the deepest part of the ocean, so that the general public might not know about the change in the traffic law. Angry, you take the case to the court. You complain to the judge that the government should have informed its citizens of the new traffic law, that it should have posted relevant road signs, but that there were no new signs on the highway. The judge replies that ignorance of the law is no excuse, and you should have made a lot of effort to find the law book at the bottom of the Philippine Trench. The judge's reply is unreasonable. So is the suggestion that we should make a lot of effort to discover God's sophisticated evaluation system.

The foregoing discussion leads to what I call *the accessibility principle*: the more accessible a rule is, the more just it is, and the more inaccessible, the more unjust it is. As the story of the new traffic law indicates, unjust rewards and punishments may result from the violation of the accessibility principle. Both the new traffic law and God's sophisticated evaluation system receive low scores in terms of the accessibility principle.

7. Animals

Let me turn to the issue regarding the evaluation of animals, such as monkeys, raccoons, ants, and earthworms. Will they go to hell or heaven, depending on whether they disbelieved or believed that God exists? Pascal's Wager is silent on this issue. Theists might suggest that animals are subject to God's evaluation, or that they are not. Both suggestions, however, are problematic.

A problem with the suggestion that God evaluates animals is that it is not clear whether animals have the cognitive capacity to believe that he exists. If they do not, it would be unjust to send them to hell, especially since he gave them their limited cognitive capacity. In addition, he should let animals know in advance what they need to do to go to heaven, in accordance with the accessibility principle. It is not clear, however, whether they have the cognitive capacity to handle his message.

A problem with the suggestion that God does not evaluate animals is that it is then not clear where they go after they die. If they do not go anywhere, can pet-lovers be happy in heaven? Why do only humans go either to heaven or hell? In addition, consider that there is approximately 1% genetic difference between humans and chimpanzees. What if scientists create organisms that are 99.5% genetically similar to humans? Such organisms might also appear as a result of genetic mutations, and the level of their intelligence might be between that of humans and that of chimpanzees. Will God evaluate them? Where does he draw the line between those he evaluates and those he does not? In the absence of answers to these questions, his evaluation system remains incomplete and imperfect.

8. Objections and Replies

8.1. No Eternal Damnation

I claimed in Section 1 that according to Pascal's Wager, disbelievers will suffer eternal damnation in hell, so they will be infinitely unhappy. My interpretation of Pascal's Wager goes hand in hand with that of Michael Martin (1983) who interprets Pascal's words like 'damnation' and 'hell' as being associated infinite disutility, and with Thomas Talbott's interpretation of Christianity that we will have "eternal destiny in heaven or hell." (2021) By contrast, my interpretation collides with that of Howard Sobel (1996) who points out that, according to Pascal,

when you wager against God, “what you stake is finite.” (Pascal 2018, 67) Therefore, my objections to God’s evaluation system regarding the punishment of disbelievers misfire.

In my view, it is not clear how damaging this criticism is to my position. In light of it, I can distinguish between the strong and weak versions of God’s evaluation system. The former says that disbelievers will experience an infinite amount of pain, whereas the latter says that disbelievers will experience a finite amount of pain. All of my criticisms against the strong version can be recast against the weak version, while leaving the essential point untouched that God’s evaluation system is flawed. For example, regarding the strong version, I objected that God issues only two extreme grades, eternal bliss and eternal damnation. Regarding the weak version, I can say that he issues only two grades, eternal bliss and finite damnation, and that finite damnation can be an extreme grade or not, depending on how theists define ‘finite damnation.’

More importantly, the weak version has the following two problems. First, it is less effective than the strong version in converting the vulgar to believers, given that finite punishment is less formidable than infinite punishment. Second, it conflicts with what the Bible says. According to the Bible (Luke 16: 26), there is a great chasm between heaven and hell, so no one can cross over from hell to heaven. Once you are sent to hell, you will stay in hell forever. Defenders of the weak version owe us a story of where hell-dwellers go after they stay in hell for a finite amount of time. Alternatively, they owe us a story of exactly how the finite amount of pain is given to disbelievers.

8.2. Different Standards

Theists might object that God’s standards of justice and benevolence are different from those of humans, so all the analogies I used in this paper are inappropriate, and the proportionality and accessibility principles that I invoked in this paper do not apply to God’s evaluation system. Thus, none of my arguments shows that it is flawed.

Let me make two comments on this defense of God’s evaluation system. First, God’s standard of morality does not seem to be different from humans’ standard of morality. After all, God told us to love our neighbors. Both God and humans agree that it is moral to love our neighbors. Second, the putative defense of God’s evaluation system can be reduced to absurdity. After all, critics could argue that God sends believers to hell and disbelievers to heaven, claiming that God’s standards of justice and benevolence differ from those of humans.

8.3. Oversensitive

Theists might object that I am oversensitive to God’s evaluation system. We should tolerate it, even if it is imperfect, just as we tolerate professors’ evaluation systems,

even if they are imperfect. Professors, for example, draw lines between As and Bs, Bs and Cs, Cs and Ds, and Ds and Fs somewhat arbitrarily.

Consider, however, that students agreed that professors would draw lines somewhat arbitrarily, and that students can opt out of professors' evaluation systems. By contrast, there is no escape from God's evaluation system. Moreover, God is more intelligent than professors, so God's evaluation system should be more sophisticated than theirs. As it stands, however, God's evaluation system is worse than theirs in many respects. Professors do not violate students' right to free thought at least as severely as God does. They do not assign only As and Fs to their students. More importantly, the higher the stakes are, the more we are, and should be, sensitive to an evaluation system. Stakes are infinitely high when God enforces his evaluation system. Therefore, we cannot be oversensitive to it.

8.4. The Pipeline Account

Theists might object that the belief of God is required for eternal salvation not because eternal salvation is the extrinsic reward assigned by God to the belief of him, but rather because the belief of him is required for union with him, and he does not want to save people against their wills. On this account, it is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy to believe that God exists. The belief of him is merely a pipeline to him.

This pipeline account of the belief of God invites the following three objections. (i) We can establish the pipeline right before we die, or right after we die. Even if atheists have the lifelong habit of ignoring God, they might be emotionally unstable right before they die, and as a result, they might establish the pipeline. It follows that we do not need to believe that God exists until our death is imminent or while we are alive.

(ii) Why did God create the evaluation system in which establishing the pipeline to him is accompanied by eternal happiness, but donating organs to fellow human beings might not be? Again, it is not clear what the relevant similarity is between establishing the pipeline and other human actions that we ordinarily take to be praiseworthy, and what the relevant similarity is between not establishing the pipeline and other human actions that we ordinarily take to be blameworthy.

(iii) It is unjust that the pipeline gives us only two extreme outputs: union and disunion with God. As noted earlier, the belief of God comes in diverse degrees and diverse lengths. Consequently, we should enjoy union with God to diverse degrees and diverse lengths, depending how strongly and how long we believe that God exists.

So what? The pipeline account of the belief of God does not help theists overcome my objection that God's evaluation system is flawed.

8.5. The Devotion to God

Theists might object that this paper talks as if only the belief that God exists is required to go to heaven. However, going to heaven requires not only the belief of God but also the devotion to God. You should love God and live a religious life to go to heaven. For example, you should go to church, pray to God, tithe, and love your neighbors.

My response to this objection is to point out that the consideration of the devotion of God would only make theists' position look worse. The devotion to God comes in diverse degrees and diverse lengths. Where does God draw the lines? For example, what if a believer is absent from church one time? How about two times? How strongly should believers love their neighbors to go to heaven? No answers to these questions are forthcoming.

Moreover, in Section 6 above, I argued that God needs to consider the four factors when he evaluates his evaluatees. They are the degree of the belief of God, the length of the belief of God, the percentage of life of believing that God exists, and the degree of the adversity of maintaining the belief of God. An issue arises as to how God should weigh these four factors. Theists' objection above reminds God that he should also consider the degree and the length of the devotion to him.

8.6. Pascal's Wager

Pascalians might object that my objections to God's evaluation system do not affect Pascal's Wager. It is still practical to believe that God exists, even if he violates the human right to free thought, even if he unjustifiably attaches praiseworthiness and blameworthiness to the belief and the disbelief of him, respectively, even if he excessively rewards and punishes believers and disbelievers, respectively, even if he fails to assign intermediate grades, even if he overlooks diverse factors related to the belief of him, and even if he is silent on the issue of animals. Therefore, my objections to Pascal's Wager misfire.

This objection to my position, however, misfires. This paper does not claim that it is impractical to believe that God exists. It rather claims that God's evaluation system is immoral, unfair, unjust, and imperfect. It is one thing that it is practical to believe that God exists, and it is another that God's evaluation system is tenable. Admittedly, it might be practical to receive a high score under an imperfect evaluation system. For example, it might be practical for students to go by professors' imperfect evaluation systems, receiving good grades, scholarships, degrees, and jobs. My point is rather that even if it is practical to receive a high score under an imperfect evaluation system, the fact remains that the evaluation system is imperfect. Of course, heaven-dwellers would feel happy about being in heaven, but it is not clear whether they can justifiably feel *proud* of being in heaven.

9. Conclusion

All the six objections that I raised against God's evaluation system in this paper jointly create a philosophical problem that I call 'the problem of divine evaluation.' It states that God's evaluation system is immoral, unfair, unjust, and imperfect, suggesting that the omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being does not exist. The problem of divine evaluation is intended to be comparable to the problem of evil which is regarded as the strongest argument against the existence of God in philosophy of religion. This paper shows, I hope, that atheists can ground their disbelief of God not only in the problem of evil but also in the problem of divine evaluation. This paper can be summed up as follows: "The perfect being's evaluation system is not perfect."

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