The Implications of Metaethical Theories on Scientific and Moral Progress

Abstract

It is a normative judgment that some moral changes are progressive. So is the judgment that some scientific changes are progressive. It follows that the eight rival metaethical theories that we discussed in Chapter 12 and 13 have competing implications on the two normative judgments, and that neither moral progress nor scientific progress supports the choice of moral realism over other metaethical theories. Although it is a normative judgment that some scientific changes are progressive, it is a factual judgment that those changes involve increases in problem-solutions, verisimilitude, knowledge, understanding, and evidence. Thus, error theory implies that the normative judgment is false, but not that the factual judgment is false. Finally, moral antirealists could accept that some scientific changes involve getting closer to scientific truths, but not that some moral changes involve getting closer to moral truths.