File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
SFX Link
- Find it @ UNIST can give you direct access to the published full text of this article. (UNISTARs only)
- Lee, Jun-Youp
- CorpFin Lab.
Views & Downloads
Detailed Information
Cited time in 
Cited time in 
Cited time in
Metadata Downloads
How powerful CEOs adopt antitakeover provisions?
- Author(s)
- Lee, Eunsuh, Kim, Chaehyun, Lee, Jun-Youp
- Issued Date
- 2022
- Citation
- APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS, v.29, no.10, pp.910 - 914
- Abstract
- We investigate how powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) adopt antitakeover provisions (ATPs). Prior studies indicate that CEOs adopt ATPs to increase their private benefits and job security. However, our evidence reveals a nonmonotonic relationship between CEO power and ATPs. Specifically, relatively less powerful CEOs adopt more ATPs, supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. However, when CEOs become sufficiently powerful, they adopt fewer ATPs, supporting the quiet life hypothesis. Overall, our findings support the notion that a simple linear relationship does not explain the effect of CEO power.
- Publisher
- Chapman & Hall
- ISSN
- 1350-4851
- Keyword (Author)
- Antitakeover provisions, CEO power, Managerial entrenchment hypothesis, Quiet life hypothesis
Items in Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.