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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.citation.endPage | 108 | - |
dc.citation.number | 3 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 89 | - |
dc.citation.title | 재무관리연구 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 37 | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Chaehyun | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lee, Eunsuh | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lee, Jun-Youp | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-12-21T17:07:19Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-12-21T17:07:19Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2020-10-01 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020-09 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this study, we examine the effect of co-opted boards on cost stickiness. Co-opted directors are defined as those who are hired after a CEO takes office. We measure board co-option in two ways: the number of co-opted board members divided by the size of the board, and the sum of the co-opted directors’ tenure divided by the sum of all directors’ tenure. Cost stickiness occurs when a firm’s costs increase with an increase in activity level to a greater degree than they decrease with a decrease in activity level. We measure cost stickiness using an operating cost stickiness model. Based on a sample of 18,237 firm-year observations in the United States for the period 1995 to 2015, we show that cost stickiness increases with the proportion of co-opted board members. In addition, we show that board co-option increases cost stickiness by undermining independent directors’ monitoring effectiveness. Finally, strong governance mitigates the positive association between co-opted boards and cost stickiness. Overall, our findings are consistent with evidence from prior studies that co-opted boards represent weak board monitoring effectiveness. | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | 재무관리연구, v.37, no.3, pp.89 - 108 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0759 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholarworks.unist.ac.kr/handle/201301/48329 | - |
dc.identifier.url | https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART002631703 | - |
dc.language | 영어 | - |
dc.publisher | 한국재무관리학회 | - |
dc.title.alternative | 코옵티드(Co-Opted)이사와 원가의 하방경직성 | - |
dc.title | Co-Opted Boards and Cost Stickiness | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | FALSE | - |
dc.identifier.kciid | ART002631703 | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | kci | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Co-Opted Boards | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Cost Stickiness | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Agency Problems | - |
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