Defense of Epistemic Reciprocalism
Cited 0 times inCited 0 times in
- Defense of Epistemic Reciprocalism
- Park, Seungbae
- Empirical Adequacy, Epistemic Reciprocalism, Scientific Antirealism, Scientific Realism, Truth
- Issue Date
- LITHUANIAN ACAD SCIENCES
- FILOSOFIJA-SOCIOLOGIJA, v.28, no.1, pp.56 - 64
- Scientific realists and antirealists believe that a successful scientific theory is true and merely empirically adequate, respectively. In contrast, epistemic reciprocalists believe that realists’ positive theories are true, and that antirealists’ positive theories are merely empirically adequate, treating their target agents as their target agents treat other epistemic agents. Antirealists cannot convince reciprocalists that their positive theories are true, no matter how confident they might be that they are true. In addition, reciprocalists criticize antirealists’ positive theories exactly in the way that antirealists criticize their epistemic colleagues’ theories. Reciprocalism is a better epistemic policy than realism and antirealism in the epistemic battleground in which we strive to be epistemically safe vis-à-vis our epistemic colleagues’ theories and strive to convince our epistemic colleagues that our theories are true.
- ; Go to Link
Appears in Collections:
- DGS_Journal Papers
can give you direct access to the published full text of this article. (UNISTARs only)
Show full item record
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.